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Abstract
There is widespread acceptance in the literature and in industry that the design of a performance
measurement system has an impact on the performance of a supply chain. But few experiments have
corroborated this wisdom. I conducted an experimental study to quantify the impact on delivery
performance that the enhancement of a performance measurement system has. The treatment was divided
in three Phases: 1. communicating overall process performance with an implicit goal; 2. providing an
explicit performance-goal; and 3. communicating performance and explicit goals at thefunctional level.
The first treatment consisted of setting up a parallel performance measurement system that: i.
improved the reliability and granularity of the performance-data collection process, ii. introduced a metric
that measured delivery variability, iii. shared this performance data regularly with the functions along the
internal supply chain, and iv. provided an implicit performance goal. Three regression models estimated
the impact on service level to be positive and significant. The result was somewhat surprising, because the
scope of the treatment was limited and some conditions in the context seemed adverse. But, it was
encouraging, because it indicated that a carefully designed performance measurement system could
improve the performance of an internal supply chain.
The results of the second treatment, introducing an explicit goal, were inconclusive. The departure of
the project sponsor coincided with the intervention, masking any effect it may have had.
The third treatment, introducing performance data segregated by functions, did not have a significant
impact on the measured performance. But, it caused the functions to stop focusing on overall performance
and increased the amount of information that had to be processed and communicated. The system was,
therefore, better off when it had one metric that encompassed all the functions. In this context, I discuss a
way to maintain accountability, despite implementing a more integrative metric.
In the appendix I propose an original methodology to analyze supply chains. It is particularly suitable
to identify sources of variability in a delivery process.
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Introduction
This chapter discusses the context and motivation of the experiment. It enunciates the research question
that the experiment is studying and reviews the literature that exists on the subject.
Context and Motivation
The Boeing Company is seeking to convert itself into a fast-growing services firm by providing solutions
rather than subsystems [1, 2]. But, successfully completing this transition requires overcoming entrenched
organizational and cultural barriers. The company needs to bring customer satisfaction metrics to the
forefront (both, intra- and inter-company) in order to complement the traditional ones that measure mostly
production costs and operational efficiencies [3]. It also needs to shift to a horizontal organization and
establish strong communications across functions and with customers, if products are to quickly react to
customer demands [4, 5]. Finally, the existing organizational construct has to give way to an incentive
structure and a culture that fosters service quality in all the steps of the supply chain. This is especially
important because competition is arising from unexpected sources, like the chop shops described in [6].
As other companies, Boeing is simultaneously an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and a
spare parts provider. Therefore, in-house part manufacturers, such as the Tube & Duct Business Unit that
sponsored this thesis, have two customers: an internal manufacturing unit that assembles new aircraft and
an external customer that buys spare parts (represented internally by a Spares Organization). This causes
two diametrically opposed supply chains to coexist and share resources. The assembly lines need a high
volume of low cost parts. The demanded quantity is relatively certain well in advance of the delivery date.
A spare part customer, on the other hand, needs rapid delivery of a few parts. It is fairly price insensitive,
as it faces high interruption costs. The resulting demand pattern is volatile. Discontinued and difficult to
produce parts represent a large share of the demand, because old parts are likelier to fail. So, a single
production line fulfilling the needs of both customers faces conflicting priorities, especially because the
two demand streams cannot be de-coupled through finished product inventory.
The Tube & Duct Manufacturing Unit supplies nearly half of the commercial-aircraft OEM-market
for rigid tubing, but is not dominant in the fragmented spare part market. I estimated that it produces less
than 10% of the spare tubing sold. A strategic analysis of the business unit uncovered a misalignment
between the needs of customers and the offered product. As a customer experiences high interruption
costs (the hourly interruption cost is ca. three orders of magnitude higher than the commodity's
production cost), its main need is to have the spare part delivered rapidly and reliably. Boeing's product
delivery was only marginally fulfilling this need, because its delivery process was slow and variable'.
This explained in part the low participation of the business unit in the high-margin spare part market for
rigid tubing.
Furthermore, the trends dominating the airline industry (privatization and liberalization) are creating
more demanding and complex spare part customers. In this industry revenues per consumer have steadily
been decreasing, while collective profits have been rising 2. There has simultaneously been a trend to
privatize national, often loss-making, flag carriers. Airlines can thus no longer just chase increased
revenues or market share, but as any other business have to generate shareholder value. This has put
enormous pressure on the airlines to maximize asset utilization and so decrease operating costs.
1 The cycle time's weekly coefficient of variation ranged between 0.4 and 1.1.
2 The average consumer pays today in real terms 20% less per mile flown than 20 years ago and revenue per seat is
declining on the average 2% per year. Simultaneously the industry went from losing $15 billion in the first few years
of the 1990s to generate collective profits of $4.5 billion in 1995 and $8.5 billion in 1997. [7]
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It is hardly surprising that slow and variable delivery of spare part tubing has induced large airlines to
integrate backward by setting up their own tube production shops. This has converted them into direct
competitors of the Tube & Duct Business Unit. These shops are financially attractive, despite their low
capacity utilization, because of the opportunity cost associated with unreliable delivery. This has caused
market fragmentation, reducing profit margins across the industry. Given the inelasticity of the demand
curve, though, Boeing should be able to gain market share by increasing the attractiveness of its product
through more reliable delivery.
A supply chain analysis uncovered several factors that undermined the performance of the supply
chain (see Incentive and Coordination Issues, page 12) and that eroded Boeing's desirability as a spare
parts supplier. The most important factor, because it hindered other improvements, was an ineffective
performance measurement and communication system. The system failed to meet several of the criteria
that Caplice and Sheffi [8, 9] propose to evaluate performance measurement systems and metrics (the
criteria are summarized in the Review of Literature, page 7, and then used to evaluate the pre-intervention
performance measurement system in An ineffective performance measurement system, page 12). This
motivated the following research question: how much impact on delivery performance can we obtain
from enhancing the performance measurement system alone?
Research Question and Hypotheses
The research question set forth is: does the enhancement of a performance measurement system
measurably impact the performance of an internal supply chain 3? In our particular context, the
enhancement will consist of:
* Using a metric that is aligned with customer needs (by measuring variability in the delivery
process) and that suggests an appropriate course of action to management.
* Expanding the measurement scope along the supply process and collecting data more reliably.
* Improving the granularity of the measurement system and the goal-setting mechanism.
Given that an important customer need in this market is rapid and reliable delivery, I will consider the
impact on supply chain performance to be positive, if it provides a higher service level at a given lead-
time. The lead-time is a management-determined constant used to indicate the maximum allowable cycle
time for a job (see Figure 1). It should be set based on customer needs and competitor's performance. In
this context, service level is the percentage of orders that are fulfilled in less than the lead-time (see, e.g.,
[10] for an introductory discussion of the service level metric). Notice that the service level provides an
indirect measurement of the variability of the delivery process.
Let me also clarify what an improvement in granularity means. The appropriate level of granularity
depends on the supply chain's characteristics. In our case, a weekly measurement of the service level is
appropriate, because a more frequent measurement would not encompass enough orders to make the
service level result meaningful, while a less frequent one would hide performance problems.
After these remarks, let me continue discussing the research question set forth. The experimental
study I devised was designed to test the following hypotheses:
HI: Measuring the performance of the entire internal supply chain reliably, communicating this data
regularly to all its functions, and providing an implicit goal for the overall process improves the
performance of the internal supply chain.
3 Internal supply chain refers to the components of a supply chain that are internal to a company.
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H2: In addition, providing an explicit goal for overall performance improves the performance of the
supply chain.
H3: In addition, communicating the performance of the functions that constitute the supply chain and
providing them with explicit goals improves the performance of the supply chain.
I, therefore, divided the study in three phases that tested these hypotheses (see Design of the Experiment,
page 15, for details). Notice that in designing the treatments, I attempted to minimize their effect on
organizational culture and structure, formal and informal incentive systems, performance review systems,
formal coordination mechanisms, and functional processes and methods.
Service level is the percentage of
orders with a cycle time smaller
than the lead-time.
Cn
-2
0
0
E
z3
Lead-time is a management-
determined constant. It is used to
indicate the maximum allowable
cycle time for a job.
The shaded area represents orders
not completed in time (i.e. their cycle
time was larger than the lead-time).
Time to fulfill orders (cycle time)
Figure 1. Definition of the service level metric and the lead-time constant.
Review of Literature
I conducted a review of literature on performance measurement systems, concentrating particularly on
their application to supply chains. This review provided a useful foundation upon which to base the
research study. First, I discuss performance measurement systems in general. Second, I point out
particularities of performance measurement systems in the context of supply chains. Third, I summarize
criteria proposed for assessing the effectiveness of performance metrics and measurement systems in
supply chains. Finally, I enumerate other factors that need to be altered in order for performance
measurement systems to drive performance.
Performance measurement systems impact performance. There is widespread acceptance in the literature
and in industry that performance measurement systems impact performance. Several proposals suggested
the use of a balanced set of financial and non-financial measures to guide the implementation of strategy
in an organization. The best known is probably the Balanced Scorecard model of Kaplan and Norton [11,
12], which aligns measures according to financial, customer, internal business, and innovation and
learning perspectives. This methodology complemented the traditional financial measures (that confirm
the results of past actions and decisions) with leading indicators for the factors that drive future financial
and operating performance. Instead of using performance measurement systems as control instruments,
the Balanced Scorecard made them vehicles to implement the firm's strategy and vision. This model was
widely embraced by business writers as a breakthrough in performance measurement. Since these general
performance measurement systems have been widely discussed in literature, let me concentrate on the
specifics of performance measurement systems applied to supply chains.
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Performance measurement systems in supply chains. It is widely accepted that a performance
measurement system is a prerequisite for properly managing a supply chain and its components [3, 8, 9,
13-16]4. In general, it is held that performance measurement fosters co-ordination along the value chain,
which is one of the central aspects of supply chain management. Furthermore, it is widely maintained that
containing a subset of metrics that evaluate the fulfillment of customer needs is necessary for the
performance measurement system to be effective [3, 11, 17-20]. Failing to effectively measure customer
needs will result in a supply chain that does not optimize customer satisfaction. Lee and Billington [16]
carried the argument one step further when they pointed out that one of the four most common pitfalls in
information definition and supply chain management was the inadequate definition of customer service5 .
All these conclusions, however, have mostly been reached on the basis of case studies and empirical
evidence. The review of literature exposed a dearth of scientific evaluations that quantify the impact that
an enhanced performance measurement system has on a supply chain's performance. This thesis attempts
to start filling this gap by carrying out such an experimental study for an internal supply chain.
Effective performance metrics for supply chains and their tradeoffs. In their seminal work, Caplice and
Sheffi [8] stated that metrics used to capture the performance of supply chains fall into one of three
primary dimensions: utilization, productivity, and effectiveness. The authors did not attempt to develop
new measures, but attempted to develop a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of performance
metrics that were already available. They summarized the results of several research projects and
proposed that an effective performance metric had to be:
* Valid by reflecting the actual process being performed and measuring controllable processes.
* Robust by being widely accepted, easily interpretable, and comparable.
* Useful by being easily understood and suggesting a course of action to the decision taker.
* Integrative by incorporating all the major components of the process and promoting cross-
functional co-operation.
* Economical by adding more value than cost.
* Compatible with the existing IT infrastructure.
* Detailed enough to be useful to the decision maker.
* Behaviorally sound by aligning people's actions with the objectives of the organization.
The authors also pointed out that the first four criteria tend to be very interconnected, causing two primary
tradeoffs. The tradeoff between validity and robustness implied that detailed and complex metrics came at
the price of lowered comparability. The tradeoff between usefulness (providing actionable guidance) and
integration (promoting co-ordination) implied that as a metric became more inclusive it lost its direct
usefulness for some of the managers within the process. The third treatment of this experimental study
dealt with a secondary tradeoff: validity versus integration. By introducing a more valid, but less
4 As early as 1989, Andersson et al. [3] recognized that a planned strategy for measurement was a prerequisite for
the successful planning, execution, and control of the activities that form the business logistics function. Caplice and
Sheffi [8, 9] argue that because supply chain management involves a set of complex and evolving structures, upper
management needs accurate and adaptable performance metrics that are maintained as a system. Foster [14] argues
that one common pitfall when outsourcing logistics is failing to measure performance. Coughlin [15] concludes that
metrics should define a company's competitive advantages and requisite business fundamentals, while supply chain
management should provide the main vehicle for achieving the goals set for these metrics. Lee and Billington [16]
argue that the absence of supply chain metrics is one of the four most common pitfalls related to supply chain
management and information definition.
5 In the section An ineffective performance measurement system (page 12) 1 discuss how the supply chain, object of
this study, was using an inadequate definition of customer service.
6 A consortium of companies and academic institutions, under the guidance of Pittiglio, Rabin, Todd, and McGrath
(PRTM) [20], developed a comprehensive set of supply chain metrics that can be used as standards. Let me warn
the reader, however, that there is no standard set of metrics that is effective for all supply chains.
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integrative metric, the treatment allowed us to evaluate performance tradeoffs. The question was how
much should the scope of the measurement be aggregated to foster co-operation versus how much should
it be broken up to foster controllability and accountability.
Effective performance measurement systemsfor supply chains. In their follow-up work, Caplice and
Sheffi [9] pointed out that an effective performance measurement system required a set of metrics,
because no individual metric could simultaneously satisfy all the above-mentioned criteria. They argued
that an effective logistics-performance measurement system had to be therefore:
* Comprehensive by capturing all the relevant performance dimensions and stakeholders.
* Causally oriented by tracking those activities that influence current and future performance.
* Vertically integrated by translating the firm's strategy to all the decision-makers in the
organization and by featuring a proper incentive system.
* Horizontally integrated by including all the pertinent activities and functions along the process.
* Internally comparable by allowing trade-offs between the different performance dimensions.
* Useful by being readily understandable and suggesting an appropriate course of action.
I analyze the pre-intervention performance measurement system in the light of these six criteria in the
section An ineffective performance measurement system (page 12).
Andersson et al. [3] had previously recognized the existence of a "measurement gap" that frequently
weakened the performance measurement systems of supply chains. This gap was brought about by the
omission of relevant performance dimensions that (in the just introduced terminology) caused a lack of
comprehensiveness and internal comparability 7. Interestingly enough, Andersson et al. illustrated this
performance gap using a case study that bore striking similarities to the internal supply chain herein
studied (see The Pre -Intervention Supply Chain, page 10). In both cases, the supply chains served OEM
and end-users and featured measurement systems that focused on cost reduction (efficiency), while the
companies' abilities to manage the flow of materials were growing increasingly worse (effectiveness).
The performances of the units were measured through the ability to manage their internal resources and
the main priority for the managers in both companies was to keep costs down to reach the budget target.
The solution, in both instances, was to bring the reliability of delivery cycle times under better control. To
achieve this, the customer service factors were given a similar status as the budget in the performance
measurement systems. This resembles the enhancements to the performance measurement system that I
introduced to the supply chain herein studied (see Design of the Experiment, page 15). Finally, in both
cases the needed information was available from the existing reporting systems, allowing the
development of a measuring model in a short time. Andersson et al. reported "substantial improvements"
that "were reached almost at once". This precedent indicated that an enhancement of performance
measurement systems was likely to have a measurable impact on performance.
Otherfactors that drive performance. I have discussed performance metrics and performance
measurement systems. But as Hauser [21] pointed out, the process of selecting the right metrics (and let
me add, the appropriate performance measurement system) is only a part of the overall process needed to
improve performance. According to Hauser, it is also necessary to establish an adequate culture, provide
the teams with new methods and processes, enhance communication among team members (and between
teams), and align the informal and formal incentive systems. These additional factors will be relevant for
interpreting the results of this experiment.
7 Andersson et al. found that measures other than financial control and physical quantities were usually omitted from
the performance measurement systems.
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The Pre-Intervention Supply Chain
This chapter describes the context of the experiment by focusing on the pre-intervention supply chain.
The description is based on the results of a supply chain analysis (the original methodology applied is
described in the Appendix: Methodology to Map the Supply Chain, page 32). I mapped the material and
information flows, compared process and cycle times for each step, and identified incentive and
coordination issues along the internal supply chain.
Material and Information Flows
Figure 2 depicts a simplified version of material and information flows in the internal supply chain. It has
been simplified for confidentiality reasons, but it conserves enough details of the process to comprehend
the context of the experimental study.
Let me describe the salient features of the flows. A Spares Organization was responsible for receiving
orders and interacting with the customer. It used a computerized system, called ATS, to capture and
handle the orders for AOG and critical spare parts8 . ATS stands for AOG Tracking System. It was the
main channel for information flow along the supply chain. It also kept track of the function that was
responsible for an order at any given time. Once ATS had checked that the order was correct and the
customer creditworthy, it assigned a tracking number to the order. An order that did not pass the initial
screening was automatically routed to an organization that dealt with the problem. On the other hand, if
the initial screening was passed, the system checked for available inventory in Boeing's Spares
Distribution Centers around the world. Lets call this initial process the Front-End. In the absence of
problems the Front-End was completed in seconds. Dealing with a problem, however, meant that the
process was several orders of magnitude longer.
If the part was in stock ATS issued an order to the Spares Distribution Center, where the part was
picked, inspected for quality, and packed. Traffic and shipping issued an FAA Airworthiness Certificate9 ,
defined the shipment method, issued export documents, and staged the part for courier pick up. This
experiment will only track the parts for which there was no stock available and that, thus, had to be
manufactured to order, because only the manufacturing functions were subject to treatment. Therefore,
the orders filled from stock were not expected to be affected by the treatment. Furthermore, most of the
orders for the specific commodity that concerned us were manufactured to order, because the existence of
tens of thousands of stock keeping units made it uneconomical to hold finished product inventory to
speed up delivery.
After verifying that there were no parts in stock, ATS routed the order to the Scheduling
organization'0 . It checked if a production plan existed. If it did not, the Planning function generated the
plan. Then, Scheduling checked the availability of the raw materials, issued sale and build orders, printed
an order to the Material Supplier, and committed a production schedule that was sent to the customer. The
Material Supplier held inventory of tube-stocks, which was cut to length upon order reception. As its
response time was short compared to the production cycle time, I omitted these upstream processes from
the analysis, focusing on the internal supply chain instead. The reception of the raw material by
Production triggered the manufacturing process. Depending on the part's material, complexity, and
8 There were three levels of criticality for spare part orders. Aircraft on Ground (AOG) orders were expected to be
filled in a few days, Critical (CRT) orders in 1-2 weeks, and Regular orders in a couple of months. This experiment
only dealt with AOG and CRT orders, because Regular orders were fulfilled through a different process.
9 This certified that a part was apt for installation, as a replacement part, on an active aircraft.
10 Scheduling, Planning, and Production were organizations of the Manufacturing Unit.
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diameter it was produced by a manufacturing cell dedicated to singular work or by regular production
cells. Most spare parts had to go through production processes shared with OEM parts, (e.g. painting,
hydraulic tests, and degreasing). Once the part was finished it was transported by truck to the Spares
Distribution Center. Subsequently, it underwent the same process as a part picked from stock.
Spars Mnufcturng nitSpares
Customer Organzasion Material Supplier Manufacturing Unit Distribution Courier
SchedulinO Planning Production Center
Airline or
refuirbishing-shop
orders Dart
Automated system
checks order and Pa I isn't on hand
---- customer's - -- ----
creditworthiness,T
assigns tracking
number, and I
routes order I
Checks if
production plan
Part i on hand: exists
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Doesn't Checks if part can
be produced, and
Production p an exists generates
V roduction plan
Checks material
availability, orders
raw material,
Uncut issues sale & build
tubing orders, commits _j
L production
tion parts 
shdl
leeninerin
assemblylin
C'slibnet __
'Part is on
hand, but Receives material,
it's a obtains
productionegnerg
part in an definition,
aircraft manufactures part
assembly Finished
STests, marks, and product
Part is on stages pat. Issues
hand and it shipping order
is a spareI
a _ ___ Picks part from
finished product
inventory
Fi-- ur 2. Material & Information Flow
Inspects and
Material Flow pack part issues
Information Flow certificate, and
arranges
Decision Process transportation
Inve ntory C : 9Shis tocustmerI
Figure 2. Simplified supply chain map. Each column corresponds to the processes that a
function is responsible for. Some steps and paths have been summarized, altered, or
om-itted for confidentiality reasons. This simplified version retains, however, the overall
structure of the actual process. The unabridged supply chain map features additional
columns that identify each step's process and cycle times and incentive and coordination
issues (see the Appendix: Methodology to Map the Supply Chain, page 32).
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Process and Cycle Times
After mapping the process, I compared the process and cycle times of each supply chain step. The process
time of a step is the total time during which value is added to the order. In queuing theory terms, the
Process Time is the sum of all the service times in a supply chain step (see, e.g., [22] for an introduction
to queuing theory). The cycle time is the total time that an order stays in a supply chain step. Again in
queuing theory terms, this would be the system occupancy time or the sum of all the service and waiting
Times. I found that most of the supply chain steps exhibited large discrepancies between their process and
cycle times. In production, for example, the ratio of process time to cycle time was roughly 1:50.
Incentive and Coordination Issues
Following the approach suggested by [5, 23], I proceeded to determine incentive (motivation) and
coordination issues along the supply chain. As a result, I identified the following four prominent issues
that were generating variability in the delivery process:
i. An ineffective performance measurement system
ii. A mismatched supply chain
iii. An adverse pricing policy
iv. A shortage of standardized processes
The following subsections describe these issues in more detail.
An ineffective performance measurement system
This section describes the pre-intervention performance measurement system in the light of the evaluation
criteria proposed in [8, 9] and summarized in the Review of Literature (page 7).
The system lacked comprehensiveness and causal orientation. The pre-intervention performance system
concentrated on measuring internal process efficiencies, ignoring two important performance dimensions:
financial results (reaching the Manufacturing Unit's overall budget target was the only financial result
measured) and customer satisfaction (between units in the company and for the entire company towards
the customer). Ignoring them caused the system to lack causal orientation. The average cycle time used by
the Spares Organization to measure the Manufacturing Units' delivery performance was appropriate for
measuring the internal efficiency of the process, but not for tracking customer satisfaction, because it: i.
ignored the variability in the delivery (see Figure 3); ii. diluted the visibility of parts with long cycle
times; and iii. overlooked the quality of service perceived by individual customers.
The system lacked vertical integration. The goal of the Spare Part Organization was to maximize the
profits generated by spare part sales. This overarching goal was however incongruent with the metrics
used to evaluate the Manufacturing Units, which were cost centers. As mentioned, customer satisfaction
and financial results, two important dimensions for profit generation, were not included in the set of
performance metrics. The Manufacturing Unit, therefore, lacked incentives to improve its performance
from a profit standpoint.
Inadequate cycle time goals also hampered the system's vertical integration. Goals were set at a
Group level (a Group comprised several Manufacturing Units). But each Group manufactured several
families of commodities, each with different degrees of complexity. This resulted in Manufacturing Units
that built complex parts working towards unattainable (or at least uneconomical) goals. While Units that
built simple commodities, had unchallenging goals that did not foster continuous improvement nor reflect
the performance of competitors. This was the case in the Manufacturing Unit that I analyzed: inadequate
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performance goals had reduced its incentive to improve delivery performance, despite the existence of
unsatisfied customer needs.
Furthermore, the system was not granular enough to track the performance of the individual functions
along the process. The functional cycle time data ATS collected was not processed. Consider, for
instance, the Scheduling function. Although there was a formal goal for orders to be scheduled in less
than four hours, the actual performance was not measured. Scheduling lacked, therefore, information to
act on and incentives to improve its performance. The problem was exacerbated by the absence of a
system at the hourly employee level that tied remuneration to performance.
Products A and B have the same a.erage Lead time is a management-determined
cycle time (both distributions have the constant used to indicate the maximum
same mean). allowable cycle time for a job.
The standard deviation of the cycle time is smaller for
product B than for product A.Product B
-2 Comparing the shaded areas under the cures, we
0
notice that the cycle time of product A has a higher
probability of exceeding the lead time than that of
Product A product B. The customer will, therefore, experience a
higher service level for product B than for product A.
Days to fulfill order
Figure 3. Despite having the same mean, two cycle time distributions will yield different
service levels, if they have different standard deviations.
The system lacked horizontal integration. It measured only the performance of the Manufacturing Units,
ignoring the performance of the Front-End and the Spares Distribution Center. These functions lacked,
therefore, incentives to improve performance and co-operate cross-functionally. This was exacerbated by
a hierarchical and vertical organizational structure that hampered the flow of communication along the
process. Prior to this experiment, for instance, the managers of Scheduling, Planning, and Production had
not met the managers of the Spares Distribution Center and the process's Supply Chain manager. This
created a challenge for the co-ordination of the supply chain.
In addition, the method used to calculate the average cycle time of the Manufacturing Unit was
inaccurate, undermining the horizontal integration of the system. On the one hand, it included orders
filled from stock at the Distribution Center, overstating the apparent performance of the Manufacturing
Unit. On the other hand, it included cycle time from the Front-End, understating the apparent
performance". The inaccuracies promoted the incorrect perception at the Manufacturing Unit that its
actual performance was adequate (if only correctly measured) and that most of the delivery issues resided
in processes out of its control.
" The performance of the Front-End escaped the control of the Manufacturing Unit. The Front-End's cycle time for
some out-of-production parts was months. This time would then be added to the Manufacturing Unit's cycle time.
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The system lacked internal comparability. By focusing exclusively on internal efficiencies, the system
failed to estimate tradeoffs between different performance dimensions. It could not measure, for example,
how much a decrease of cycle time could be worth in terms of higher production costs (while achieving
higher profitability). The average cycle time was however robust, because it was easily comparable and
its definition was easy to understand. Measuring it was economic, because the benefits, albeit limited,
outweighed the costs of tracking it. Finally, it was compatible with the existing information systems.
The system lacked usefulness. Although average cycle time is an easily understood and a widely accepted
metric (see, e.g., [20]), it failed to suggest an appropriate course of action in our particular case. It implied
that a delivery improvement would require a generalized cycle time reduction. But, this would not be an
economical cause of action, because it would only marginally improve customer satisfaction. On the other
hand, a reduction of the variability in delivery or of the number of parts with long delivery times would be
simpler and have a higher impact.
Moreover, performance glitches were hidden in a six-month rolling-average cycle time measurement
that was reviewed monthly. An attempt by the Spares Organization to change this metric to a weekly
average, encountered opposition from the Manufacturing Units because they refused to "spend all their
time answering the phone, explaining why their performance had slipped that week".
A mismatched supply chain
Two types of supply chains, pursuing conflicting objectives, were coexisting and sharing physical and
organizational resources. Using Fisher's terminology [24], a physically efficient supply chain and a
market-responsive supply chain were in competition. The market responsive supply chain served a low
volume, volatile, external market for spare parts. Its goal was to fulfill orders quickly and reliably in order
to satisfy customer needs. The physically efficient supply chain, on the other hand, was optimized for a
high-volume, predictable, and internal market for OEM parts. Its main objective was to minimize
production costs. Boeing had apparently given priority to the physically efficient supply chain in
detriment of the market responsive one, generating some customer dissatisfaction in the external market.
An adverse pricing policy
The prevailing spare part pricing policy was also impacting the supply chain's performance. Boeing did
not price-differentiate between AOG, Critical, and Regular orders. This created two problems: i. A critical
part yielded lower profit margins, because of its higher production cost. ii. The customer did not have an
incentive to reveal its reservation delivery date. This caused an adverse selection problem. When the
market responsive supply chain had delivery problems due to an excess of AOG and Critical orders, the
customers had an incentive to exaggerate the criticality level of even more orders.
A shortage of standardized processes
Insufficient standard procedures also contributed to the cycle time's variability. Production and
Scheduling, for instance, were not aware of the distinction between AOG and Critical orders. They
handled everything as an AOG, thus devoting an excess of resources to the fulfillment of less critical CRT
orders. The Spares Distribution Center and Planning, on the other hand, had different processes for CRT
and AOG orders, but their contribution to overall cycle time was small. So, from the perspective of
overall delivery performance AOG and CRT orders were essentially undistinguishable. Lack of
standardized processes was also apparent when the absence of an experienced scheduler or production
leader measurably affected the performance of an entire function.
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Design of the Experiment
The sections in this chapter describe the four phases of the experimental study. Using the terminology
introduced in the Review of Literature (page 7), the treatments enhanced the performance measurement
system along the following dimensions:
* Comprehensiveness, casual orientation, and usefulness. The service level metric I introduced
suggested an appropriate course of action to management and was aligned with customer needs.
* Horizontal integration. I improved the reliability of the measurement and expanded its scope to
encompass the entire supply process (the performance of each function along the supply process
was tracked).
* Vertical integration. I shared performance information regularly with all the functions and
increased the granularity of both, the performance measurement and its goal.
The experiment concentrated on delivery performance, so the lack of internal comparability of the pretest
system was not addressed. Similarly, the focus on delivery performance only improved the system's
comprehensiveness along that one single performance dimension. The treatment did not directly alter the
institutional performance measurement system used throughout Boeing, but created a parallel
measurement system for the internal supply chain studied.
Phase 0: Collection of Pre-Treatment Control Data
I collected pre-treatment control data for the five functions along the internal supply chain for a period of
eight weeks (see Material and Information Flows, page 10, for a description of these functions). This data
controlled for pre-intervention performance levels. Boeing's AOG Tracking System (ATS) enabled an
indirect, yet reliable performance measurement. As ATS was the standard system to track all AOG and
CRT orders, it allowed the gathering of data without alteration of the functional work processes.
ATS contained not only sales and product data, but featured a time-stamped log for each order12 . The
log documented when an order was transferred from one function to the next. It allowed me to trace the
routing of each order and, thus, filter out the orders relevant to this experiment: tubes manufactured to
order at the Tube & Duct Manufacturing Unit. ATS had another log (called the scratchpad) that was used
to document problems that arose during the order fulfillment process. The functions had an incentive to
keep this log accurately, because it constituted the only source of information for answering customer's
inquiries and complaints and it provided the main communication channel between functions (it was
complemented through the use of electronic-mail and phone).
Even if invisible to the functions, this phase already featured improvements to the performance
measurement system. i. It expanded the measurement scope to include the Spares Distribution Center (this
function had not been included in previous delivery performance measurements). ii. It improved the
reliability of data collection by focusing on one commodity manufactured to order by one single
manufacturing unit. iii. It increased the granularity of the measurement by tracking the performance of
each of the functions along the supply chain, measuring the time to complete each individual order, and
reducing the time between measurements from one month to one week.
12 As in the two case studies in [9], ATS did not measure the total cycle time seen by the customer, but only tracked
the order until it was shipped from the Spares Distribution Center.
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Phase 1: Communication of Overall Performance with an Implicit Goal
The purpose of this phase was to test the first hypothesis (H1). I, therefore, communicated process-wide
delivery-performance to the functions along the supply chain for a period of four weeks. This overall
performance naturally escaped the control of any one function. Performance improvement could be
expected from increased cross-functional collaboration and functional performance (as [3, 16] suggest).
This phase introduced a new delivery performance metric alongside the enhancements launched in the
previous phase. While retaining the average cycle time (the only pre-intervention metric for delivery
performance), I introduced the time it had taken to fulfill 95% of the week's orders (i.e. the time at which
a 95% service-level would be achieved 3 ). Using this metric suggested a more appropriate course of
action to management, because it drew attention to the parts that had had an excessive cycle time and that
therefore impacted customers the most. Management chose the value of 95%, foreseeing the instauration
of a challenging, yet attainable goal. Not choosing 100% took into account that a fraction of orders
corresponded to out-of-production parts that had intrinsically longer cycle times. So, by choosing the 95%
service level management was signaling its interest in focusing on mainstream orders.
Management retained the average cycle time metric to facilitate the function's adoption of the new
performance measurement system. I improved the granularity and accuracy of this metric, however, by
replacing the six-month rolling-average cycle time that encompassed several commodities (hiding
problems) with a weekly measurement of parts manufactured to order and of a single commodity type.
Every week, I shared with the functions a histogram of the cycle time, corresponding to the orders
completed during the previous week (Figure 4 depicts a sample). The graph had a line that indicated when
a 95% service-level would have been achieved and a list of the orders in the upper 5%-ile. The purpose of
the list was twofold: instigate curiosity about the root causes of long cycle time orders and suggest an
appropriate course of action for improvement. I also shared a historic performance chart that showed the
behavior over time of the weekly average cycle time and the time to fulfill 95% of the orders (see Figure
5). Its main purpose was to provide information about trends over time.
I rolled out the new measurement system by meeting with each function, explaining that the new
system tracked customer need fulfillment more closely and would, thus, predict customer satisfaction
better. After this roll out, I relied almost entirely on the existing communication channels to minimize the
impact of an external presence on the experiment's results. So, on a weekly basis, I sent out the data to the
functional supervisors via electronic-mail and asked them to share it with their teams during their regular
staff meetings. Two areas, Production and Planning, additionally posted the information in a visible area.
Throughout this phase management shared only implicit goals with the functions4.
The performance of the Front-End and the Spares Distribution Center constituted suitable post-
treatment control-sets, because they constituted exceptions to the just described flow of information.
These sets would therefore control for effects that were unrelated to the treatment, but that affected all the
functions. Tubing was only a small fraction of the parts handled by the Spares Distribution Center, so
despite management's interest in supporting the project it was uneconomical to introduce new processes
for handling a single commodity. The Front-End comprised a number of loosely coupled functions that
only occasionally intervened in the completion of an order. It was, therefore, uneconomical to involve all
these functions in the experiment. Furthermore, the Front-End and the Spares Distribution Center were
part of a different organization than Scheduling, Planning, and Production, which were part of the
Manufacturing Unit.
1 See Figure 1 (page 7) for a definition of service level.
14 In the Potential Limitations chapter (page 27) 1 discuss the extent to which this goal was implicit.
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16 -
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
cj,
0
Tm O to fuCfC)l rd [ s 0 Cj
Time to fulfill order [units not disclosed]
C "t Ln1
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SISNum PartNumber CT
549xxx xxx63469-37 16.5 time units
093xxx xxxW6191-46 15.4 time units
435xxx xxx63469-15 13.5 time units
Figure 4. Sample histogram for Experimental Phase 1: number of orders versus cycle
time. The dotted lines indicate the average cycle time and the time to fulfill 95% of the
orders. The box on the lower left contains summary statistics for the week and the one on
the right shows tracking and part numbers for orders in the upper 5%-ile of cycle time.
The units used to measure cycle time are not disclosed for confidentiality reasons.
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Figure 5. Sample historic performance chart for Experimental Phase 1. It shows the
weekly average cycle time and time to complete 95% of the orders. As before, the units
used to measure cycle time are not disclosed for confidentiality reasons.
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Phase 2: Communication of Overall Performance with an Explicit Goal
This phase, which lasted five weeks, was designed to test the second hypothesis (H2). Management
provided the functions with an explicit goal for overall performance by choosing a lead-time (value not
disclosed for confidentiality reasons) for which the service level should be 95% or more. The goal was
determined in such a way that it was challenging (given historic performance), better aligned with lead-
times prevalent in the market, and, at least apparently, attainable (given the process to cycle time ratios).
The addition of an explicit goal enhanced the performance measurement system in several ways.
First, it further aligned the suggested course of action with the needs of customers and the performance of
competitors. Second, it increased the granularity of the performance measurement system by setting an
explicit goal for a single commodity. As discussed, in the pre-intervention system several commodities
with heterogeneous complexities shared a unique goal (i.e. a single average cycle time goal).
The information shared with the functions now featured lines that made the performance goal explicit.
Figure 6 shows the cycle time histogram and Figure 7 the historic performance chart that I shared weekly.
In the Potential Limitations chapter (page 27) I discuss potential improvements to these graphs.
Cycle time from order placement to shipment for tubing
manufactured at Tube & Duct North (week xx, 2000)
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021xxx xxx6510-28 8.5 time units
071xxx xxxN6202-20 8.4 time units
838xxx xxx4546-3345 7.6 time units
203xxx xxxN1242-19 7.4 time units
224xxx xxx6509-20 6.5 time units
604xxx xxxN6444-1210 6.3 time units
309xxx xxx7389-131 6.2 time units
092xxx xxxT2004-12 6.2 time units
Average cycle time: 4.5 time units
Standard deviation: 2.7 time units
Minimum cycle time: 0.9 time units
Maximum cycle time: 19.4 time units
Total number of orders: 63 orders
95% Service Level Line: 8.5 time units
Figure 6. Sample histogram for Phase 2: number of orders versus cycle time. The dotted
lines indicate the time to fulfill 95% of the orders and the corresponding performance
goal. As before, the box on the lower left contains summary statistics for the week. The
one on the right shows tracking and part numbers for orders that failed to meet the goal.
The units used to measure cycle time are not disclosed for confidentiality reasons.
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Figure 7. Sample historic performance chart for Experimental Phase 2. It shows as
before the weekly average cycle time and the time to complete 95% of the orders. The
solid line indicates the goal for the service level metric. The units used to measure cycle
time are not disclosed for confidentiality reasons.
Phase 3: Communication of Functional Performance with Explicit Goals
The final phase, which lasted three weeks, was designed to test the third hypothesis (H3). I continued
increasing the granularity of the system by communicating, in addition to the overall performance, the
performance of each function: Front-End, Scheduling, Planning, Production, and Spares Distribution
Center. Management defined an individual lead-time for each function, based on the theoretical process
time and the historical cycle times. The sum of these individual lead-times was equal to the overall lead-
time defined in Phase 2 for the entire internal supply chain. The goal was for each function to reach a
service level of 95% or greater at its assigned lead-time 5 . Each individual function had now two
performance graphs similar to those shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. I also continued to share the
performance data weekly, but it was comprised now by 12 graphs altogether (10 corresponded to
functional performance and two to overall performance).
The purpose of this phase was to determine the impact on delivery performance from increasing
measurement granularity. By measuring the performance of each individual function, the metric increased
in validity (the functions had more control over the measured processes) at the expense of integration (the
incentive to co-operate cross-functionally was lessened). It was reasonable to expect that the increase in
validity would simultaneously boost the accountability that the functions had for their performance.
" Note that meeting each of the functional goals did not guarantee that the overall service level goal would be met.
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Analysis of the Experiment
This section describes the quantitative analysis of the gathered data. I first propose a linear model to
extract the impact of the treatment. I then present the results of using an ordinary least squares method to
determine the best coefficients to fit the model to the experimental observations (see Method 1:
Determining the Post-Intervention Effect with a Complete Data-Set).
At the beginning of Phase 2 (week 13) the Operations Manager of the Manufacturing Unit
unexpectedly departed and was not replaced. This event is relevant for the analysis, because he was the
sponsor and visible champion of the performance measurement redesign. His departure changed the
informal incentive structure and the employee's perception of the importance of the project. The service
levels at the Front-End and the Spares Distribution Center failed to control for this event, because the
Operations Manager was responsible for Planning, Scheduling, and Production only. I controlled for this
eventuality in two ways. i. I truncated the data set at week 13 and evaluated the effect of the treatment
(see Method 2: Determining the Post-Intervention Effect by Truncating the Data-Set). ii. I introduced a
control variable to control for the effect (see Method 3: Determining the Impact of the Three Phases).
A second event relevant for the analysis occurred at the end of Phase 2 and beginning of Phase 3
(weeks 16 and 17). For a period of at least two weeks, Production endured a raw material problem at its
main supplier that increased the time to deliver raw tube-stock by a factor of ca. seven. This affected the
service level of the Production function. Given that the impact of this exogenous problem was short-lived
and restricted to a single function, I treated these two observations as outliers, disregarding them from the
analyzed data set.
A Linear Model
Although simply comparing the pre- and post-intervention service levels may sound intuitively appealing,
we need a more complex model to distinguish the effect of the test from other sources of variability. I will
therefore use the following model to determine how the experiment impacted the service level of
Scheduling, Planning, and Production:
service levelNj+i = P + $ scheduling;j + P 2 plannning i, + P 3 orders completed in planning i,
+ 4 orders completed in production ij + @5 orders completed in front endi (1)
+ 6 service level front ends + P 7 service levelSDCi + 8 test; + Eij,,
where:
* i indexes weekly observations with i = 1, ... , N and N = 20;
* j is an index that differentiates observations of Scheduling, Planning, and Production:
0, for observations of Scheduling
j= 1, for observations of Planning
2, for observations of Production
1, if j=0
i' 0, otherwise
. 1, if 1=1
p lanning - . ;'j = 0, otherwise
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. orders completed in Planning in week i, if j =1
" orders completed in planning 
. .f j#;
- {0 ifj#1'
forders completed in Production in week i, if j#1 16
* orders completed in production;,1  0 if j=
* orders completed in front end; is the number of orders the Front-End completed in week i;
* service level front-end; is the service level observed at the Front-End in week i;
* service level SDCi is the service level observed at the Spares Distribution Center in week i;
1, if i > 9 (i.e., it is a postintervention measurement)
0, otherwise
* Ei, is a random error; and
service level of Scheduling in week i, if 1 Nj + i N
* service levelNj+i = service level of Planning in week i, if N +1 Nj + i 2N
service level of Planning in week i, if 2N +1 Nj + i 3N
The service levels of the Front-End and the Spares Distribution Center control for effects that were
unrelated to the treatment, but that affected all the functions, as discussed in the Design of the Experiment
chapter. The weekly number of orders processed in Planning, Production, and the Front-End control for
capacity utilization effects. I omitted the numbers of orders completed by Scheduling and the Spares
Distribution Center, because they did not differ by more than 1% from the number of orders completed by
Production. Including these variables in the model would have caused collinearity problems.
Method 1: Determining the Post-Intervention Effect with a Complete Data-Set
In this method I used the entire data set (i.e. i = 1, ..., N, with N = 20)17. The objective of this analysis was
to determine whether the initial treatment had impacted the performance of the supply chain. I used a least
squares method to determine the coefficients po, ... , f3 from Equation (1) that best fit the observed data.
The acceptance or rejection of the first hypothesis (HI) depends on the value estimated for ps. A
significant and positive P8 would support (Hi). I initially considered all the variables included in Equation
(1), but found that the coefficients for some variables were not significant and did not affect the other
coefficients in the model. After removing these regressors, I obtained the coefficients shown in Table 1.
An adjusted R2 of 0.63 indicated that the model fit the data adequately. The next chapter discusses these
results and complements them with anecdotal evidence.
Let me briefly discuss the variables that had non-significant coefficients. The Front End's service
level and the number of completed orders did not seem to affect the service level of Scheduling, Planning,
and Production (P5 ~P ZO 0). This is not surprising, because the Front End is composed of functions that
are only loosely coupled with the subsequent completion of orders.
16 This variable is zero only for observations of Planning, because Production and Scheduling complete by
construction the same number of orders per week.
17 The actual number of observations was reduced to 3N- 2 = 58, because of the two weeks of raw material delivery
problems that affected Production.
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Method 2: Determining the Post-Intervention Effect by Truncating the Data-Set
In this method I truncated the data set after week 12 to take into account the departure of the Operations
Manager (i.e. i = 1, ... , N', with N'= 12). The objective, as before, was to test the first hypothesis (HI). I
used again a least squares estimation method to determine the coefficients po, ... , N3 from Equation (1).
After discarding the variables with coefficients that were not significant, I obtained the coefficients shown
in Table 1. With an adjusted R2 of 0.62 this model also fit the data adequately.
As before, the Front End's service level and number of completed orders did not seem to have a
significant impact on the observed service level (05 ~ 06 0). Furthermore, during the first 12 weeks of
the experiment the number of orders completed by Planning and Production did not seem to be significant
in explaining the output either (f ~ 4 0). This indicated that the capacity utilization of the functions
did not have a major impact on their delivery performance during that period of time.
I carried out an additional analysis to determine if the improvement in performance had been
homogeneously distributed across the three treated functions. I added two variables to the model: i. Test
Planning assumes the value one for post-treatment observations of Planning and zero otherwise, ii.
Similarly, Test Scheduling is one for post-treatment observations of Scheduling and zero otherwise. The
coefficients estimated for these variables measured the distribution of the performance improvements
among the three treated functions. I found these coefficients to be zero (p ~ .77), which indicated that the
performance improvements were relatively homogeneously distributed among the three treated functions.
Method 3: Determining the Impact of the Three Phases
To analyze the impact of the three post-intervention phases of the experiment I added two variables to (1).
As a result:
service levelNj+i = + P scheduling;, +02 plannning g, + 133 orders completed in planning ,j
+ 4 orders completed in production ,j + @ 5 orders completed in front end(
+ 6 service level front end; + 7 service levelSDCi + 8 phase 1 + P9 phase 2;
+ P10phase 3i + Eij,
where:
1, if i 9 (i.e., it is an observation after Phase 1 started)
* phase I; testi = 0, otherwise
1, if i 13 (i.e., it is an observation after Phase 2 started)
phase 2i 0, otherwise
1, if i 18 (i.e., it is an observation after Phase 3 started)
phase 13i -0, otherwise
Two issues have to be taken into account as part of this analysis. First, the absence of the Operations
Manager coincided with the treatment of Phase 2. Therefore the coefficient of Phase 2 will
simultaneously control for the implementation of explicit goals and the absence of the Operations
Manager. Second, it was apparent from the onset that time restrictions would limit the size of the sample,
complicating the analysis of the effects of the three phases. Gathering a larger sample during the same
amount of time would have required increasing the granularity of the measurement (e.g. measuring more
frequently than once per week). But, such a measurement would not have been valid (it would have been
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too volatile due to the small number of orders completed per day) nor economical (major modifications of
ATS would have been required). Therefore, in some instances it was necessary to complement the
quantitative results with anecdotal evidence (see the Results chapter, page 24) in order to draw
meaningful conclusions from the data.
I determined the coefficients po, ... , Pi from Equation (2), using a least squares estimation method. I
eliminated the variables that did not contribute significantly to the explanation of the output and obtained
the coefficients recapped in Table 1. An adjusted R2 of 0.65 indicated an adequate fit of the observed data.
As in the previous analysis the number of orders and the service level of the Front End did not
contribute significantly to explain the output. On the other hand, the number of orders completed by
Planning and Production/Scheduling, seemed to have now some, albeit small impact on the output.
Negative P3 and $4 indicated that the service level decreased slightly as the number of orders increased.
This was to be expected from a capacity utilization perspective. A higher estimate for P2 than for pi
indicated that Planning was the best performing function. A relatively small Pi indicated that Production
and Scheduling had roughly comparable performances. Finally, a relatively high p7 suggested that the
performance of the independently managed Spares Distribution Center was quite correlated with that of
the observed functions, making it apparently an adequate control variable.
Regressor
Intercept
Scheduling
Planning
Orders completed
in planning
Orders completed
in production
Service Level
SDC
Test/Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
R 2
Number of observations
Model 1
0.285
(0.157)
0.038
(0.038)
0.324
(0.101)
-0.008
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.423
(0.173)
0.094
(0.035)
N/A
Model 2
0.103
(0.227)
0.012
(0.050)
0.365
(0.172)
-0.008
(0.103)
-0.000
(0.002)
0.588
(0.228)
0.150
(0.045)
N/A
Model 3
0.335
(0.157)
0.038
(0.038)
0.299
(0.102)
-0.010
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.424
(0.170)
0.136
(0.042)
-0.068
(0.048)
N/A N1AN/A N/A(0.05 1)
0.633
58
0.623
36
0.645
58
Table 1. Regressor coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) determined through the
ordinary least squares estimation of equations (1) and (2). Models 2 and 3 control for the
departure of the Operations Manager by truncating the data set and introducing the
variable Phase 2, respectively.
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PO
s2
8
$9
s1o
Results
This section presents the results of the three experimental phases. First, I discuss how the experiment
supports the first hypothesis (HI). Then, I discuss the results of the second treatment, which were
inconclusive. Finally, I discuss how the third intervention did not significantly impact performance.
Phase 1: Results Support the First Hypothesis
Table 1 summarizes the estimated coefficients. In all three models, the coefficient estimated to describe
the impact of the first intervention (p8) was positive and significant (p < .011 for model 1 and p < .002 for
models 2 and 3). Model 1, which did not control for the departure of the Operations Manager nor the
second and third treatments, estimated P8 at .094 (.035). The two models that controlled for these events
yielded higher P8 estimates: .150 (.045) and .136 (.042). Furthermore, the additional test of Method 2
indicated that the improvements in the three treated functions were roughly equally distributed. These
results support the first hypothesis (H1), i.e. delivery performance improves by reliably measuring the
performance of the entire internal supply chain at an appropriate level of granularity, regularly
communicating this data to all the functions along the chain, and implicitly providing a goal for the entire
process. These results are encouraging, because they indicate that a carefully designed performance
measurement system could improve the performance of an internal supply chain.
A rudimentary comparison of the average pre- and post-intervention service levels for each function
shows improvements ranging between 7 and 10 percentage points (see Table 2). This, of course, is not a
rigorous analysis, because the performance improvement cannot be solely attributed to the treatment. It
gives however an idea of the magnitude of the post-test improvement that management may have
perceived, if it had applied such a simple analysis method. Notice that these improvements are of the
same order of magnitude as the coefficient P8 estimated in the previous section. By comparison, the
control functions either maintained or worsened their delivery performance during the same timeframe.
Treatment Control
Scheduling Planning Production Front-End SDC
Pre-treatment 58% 88% 57% 95% 82%
Post-treatment 68% 97% 64%" 93% 76%
Table 2. Rudimentary comparison of average pre- and post-intervention service levels.
The entire performance improvement is not attributable to the treatment, but it gives an
idea of the magnitude of improvement that could have been measured by management,
had it applied such a simple analysis technique.
Anecdotal evidence further supports the hypothesis. A problem that had remained unsolved for years,
for instance, was solved through increased cross-functional coordination and communication. The
problem was related to the design of long spare parts. A long tube that is installed as a single unit during
OEM manufacture may not be installable as a spare part, unless redesigned into an assembly. Planning
had the capability to redesign the part, but lacked the engineering authority to do so. It could take days or
weeks for the external Engineering entity to approve the plan that Planning had issued. This affected
Planning's delivery performance. A member of the Planning team decided to work cross-functionally to
deal with this coordination issue. Despite the challenge posed by the organization's vertical and
18 As in the models described in the previous section, the data points corresponding to the two weeks in which
Production's supplier suffered from severe raw material problems have been excluded from this calculation.
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compartmentalized structure, the effort was successful in removing the root cause of the problem. An
interview with the person, who organized this effort, corroborated that the higher visibility of the problem
generated by the post-intervention performance measurement system had created an additional incentive
to address the problem's root cause.
An increase in cross-functional communication, following the issuance of performance data, provided
additional anecdotal evidence to support the first hypothesis (Hi). After the first treatment, I observed an
increase in the number of electronic mails dealing with spare part performance. Communications dealt
mainly with three topics: inquiries about particular parts with long cycle times, explanations for past or
upcoming performance glitches, and concerns about data validity and integrity19 . The list of long cycle
time parts included in the graphs triggered many of these communications (see Figure 4, page 17, and
Figure 6, page 18). It showed that only a fraction of parts had problems exogenous to the Business Unit
and, thus, overturned management's preconception that most of the problems affecting delivery
performance were caused externally. This evidence suggested that the treatment increased the visibility of
the process, creating implicit incentives to improve performance.
Finally, let me discuss why in the case of Planning the performance improvement, due to the
treatment may be understated. First, it was more difficult for Planning to improve, because it already
exhibited better performance than Scheduling and Production (notice that p2> 01; see Table 1). Second, a
month before I initiated the collection of control data, Planning set up its own rudimentary delivery
performance measurement system. It kept a logbook with the inception and completion time of all orders.
Every week, the data registered in the log was summarized in a chart and sent out to the team in electronic
format. It contained a historical weekly-average cycle time graph, similar to that in Figure 5. The process
had shortcomings20, but it may have caused Planning to start improving performance and process control
prior to the first treatment.
It should not be taken lightly that the experiment supports the hypothesis. As Hauser [21] points out,
metrics are only one part of the overall system required to impact performance. A culture needs to be
established, teams have to be provided with new methods and processes, communication among team
members and between teams has to be enhanced, and informal and formal incentive systems have to be
set up. While I restricted the intervention to the performance measurement system, some aspects of the
context seemed adverse: i. The new system was run in parallel to an institutional performance
measurement system. Therefore, the new metric introduced differed from the one that senior management
kept track of. ii. The organization lacked at the hourly employee level a formal, metrics-based
performance review process and a system linking remuneration to performance. Therefore, the
improvement was not supported by a formal incentive structure. iii. The functions exhibited only an
incipient continuous-improvement culture. iv. The hierarchical and compartmentalized structure of the
organization hindered cross-functional communication. So, it was somewhat surprising that despite these
hindrances the upgrade of the performance system triggered by itself a measurable improvement in
delivery performance. It seems to indicate that changing the performance measurement system constitutes
a high leverage action for an organization. The question (beyond the scope of this thesis) remains,
whether the elicited performance improvements are sustainable. Hauser [21] mentions that most strategic
initiatives lead to early improvements but later disappoint. The initial enthusiasm with which an initiative
is greeted may taper off over time.
19 Concerns about data validity ceased a few weeks after the first treatment's inception. Providing a concrete list of
parts that had had long cycle times dissipated these doubts.
20 The system relied on people's motivation to record accurate data and rather than recording the moment that the
order had been routed to Planning it registered the moment a person had first noticed the order.
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Phase 2: Results are Inconclusive about the Second Hypothesis
The departure of the Operations Manager coincided with the second treatment, masking the effect of
introducing an explicit performance goal. This impeded drawing a meaningful conclusion about the
second hypothesis (H2). The performance of the Front-End and SDC did not control for his departure,
because he managed only the treated functions. The coefficient estimated for Phase 2 (p9) was -.068
(.048). A p ~ .16, suggested that the combined effect of the departure and the second treatment did not
have a significant impact on performance. Two hypotheses for explaining this result are: i. neither the
departure nor the treatment had a measurable impact on performance, or ii. both had measurable, but
opposite effects that cancelled each other out. Let me try to qualify the likelihood of these hypotheses.
Anecdotal data suggested that the departure of the Operations Manager had an effect on the informal
incentive structure that upheld the experiment. Apparently, the perception of importance of the project
decreased with his absence, making managers reluctant to continue sharing the performance data with
their teams. This was hardly surprising, because the new metric was not embedded in the institutional
performance measurement system, but largely depended on the support of individuals like the Operations
Manager. So, it is likely that his departure may have had some negative effect on performance.
Let me discuss now the potential impact of introducing an explicit goal. The goal set for an official
metric (i.e. a metric that makes part of the institutional performance measurement system) seems to be
relevant for the Business Units. They had refused to accept new goals proposed by the Spares
Organization, because they would affect management's perception of their performance. This showed a
concern, at least at the managerial level, that official goals be met. The question is whether this was also
the case for goals established in parallel to the official performance measurement system. A second
question is to what extent the difference between the implicit and explicit goals (introduced in the first
and second treatments, respectively) was significant. By introducing a metric that indicated how long it
had taken to complete 95% of the orders, the first treatment may already have made the performance goal
relatively explicit. As a result, the second treatment that introduced the lead-time for which management
desired to achieve a 95% service level, may not have been enough of a change to trigger a significant
response in the system.
Phase 3: Tradeoffs between Functional Accountability and Global Optimization
The coefficient corresponding to the effect of the third treatment (0io) was not significantly different than
zero: -.031 (.051). With p ~.55, this result apparently rejected the third hypothesis (H3). This is a
somewhat paradoxical result, because from the experiment's inception functional managers insistently
requested performance data segregated by function. This phase dealt with the tradeoff between a metric's
validity and its ability to integrate. By increasing the measurement's granularity, the treatment attempted
to increase the accountability and controllability that each function had over the measured performance at
the expense of cross-functional integration. But the quantitative evidence indicated that there was no
improvement in the function's performance. The treatment caused the functions to stop focusing on
overall performance and start concentrating inward, as evidenced by: i. Some functions requesting to
receive their own performance data only. ii. An abrupt decay in the number of electronic mails exchanged
after the issuance of the weekly data. iii. A failure to mention in these communications the parts that had
not succeeded in meeting the overall lead-time. Furthermore, the treatment caused an increase in the
amount of information that had to be processed and communicated.2 So, even if the performance did not
improve, the system was better off when it had one metric that encompassed all the functions. It could be
conjectured that in the long run the post-treatment system would have emphasized local performance,
creating less incentives to co-operate cross-functionally.
21 Segregating the performance data incremented the amount of data that each function had to review.
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Potential Limitations
From the onset it was apparent that the sample size would be limited, because of the restricted time
available for the experiment. As discussed in Method 3: Determining the Impact of the Three Phases
(page 22), the size could not be increased without affecting the metric's validity. This made it difficult to
assess the impact of the last two interventions. Therefore, future research that carries out similar
treatments, but over longer periods of time, is needed. This would not only increase the sample size, but
also uncover potential changes in performance that only become manifest over longer time horizons. It
would also cast light onto the question of sustainability of the induced performance improvement.
This thesis could not draw meaningful conclusions about the introduction of explicit goals in an
internal supply chain, because of an external event that coincided with the inception of the second
treatment. This event may have caused an unwanted impact on the output that could not be filtered out
using the control variables. A second issue that needs further analysis is whether the implicit goal
introduced in the first treatment was already too explicit. This could have caused the second treatment to
fail to generate a measurable impact on performance, even in the absence of the external eventuality.
Let me also point out some limitations related to metrics and their communication. First, notice that
throughout the experiment I tracked functional performance by measuring service levels. But the lead-
times necessary to calculate these service levels were only established in Phase 3. So, until then, the
functions were being measured against a performance target that they were not aware of. Second, the
historical performance graph (see, e.g., Figure 7, page 19) informed the functions about the time it had
taken to fulfill 95% of the orders. But a bar chart showing each week's service level would have more
accurately depicted the performance that was being measured. This may have created some
misalignment between the communicated and the measured performance. Third, management set the
95%-goal for service level relatively arbitrarily.23 The overall lead-time was based more on historical
performance than on customer needs, competition, and cost tradeoffs, as a more rigorous approach would
have suggested. Fourth, we adopted the service level metric because it was a function of the variability in
the delivery. However, once a part exceeded the lead-time, the service level failed to measure by how
much the goal had been missed. This may have caused the metric to suggest unwanted causes of action.
Finally, notice that the customers would benefit the most of service level improvements at the overall
supply chain level, but I have measured improvements at the functional level instead.
It is also important to recognize that the particularities of the context may have overstated the impact
of the treatment. The internal supply chain that I intervened had abundant room for quick and significant
improvements, as the large process to cycle time ratio, the absence of robust processes, and the limited
cross-functional communication evidenced. A supply chain with better pre-treatment performance may
not respond to the treatment as rapidly and noticeably, as the one herein discussed did.
There were two reasons for adopting the line-graph over the bar chart. First, we did not want to provide the
functions with an explicit goal in the first treatment. To do this, we had to set up a metric that had the benefits of a
service level measurement, without requiring the definition of a lead-time. Second, management wanted graphs to
allow it to see trends in performance data, once the goal had been met. A bar chart of the service level would not
have met this requirement.
95% was chosen to take into account the existence of out of production parts that had above-average cycle times.
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Conclusions
I reported on the results of an experimental study that modified the performance measurement system of
an internal supply chain. I divided the experiment in three phases and then evaluated the impact on
performance of these modifications. The phases consisted of communicating:
i. overall process performance with an implicit goal,
ii. overall process performance with an explicit goal, and
iii. functional performance with explicit goals.
The results of the first treatment supported the hypothesis that delivery performance improves by
reliably measuring the performance of the entire internal supply chain at an appropriate level of
granularity, regularly communicating this data to all the functions along the chain, and implicitly
providing a goal for the entire process. It was somewhat surprising that the experiment supported the
hypothesis, because the scope of the treatment was limited and some conditions in the context seemed
adverse: i. The new system was run in parallel to the institutional performance measurement system.
Therefore, the new metric differed from the ones that senior management kept track of. ii. The
organization lacked, at the hourly employee level, a formal, metrics-based performance review process
and a system that linked remuneration to performance. Therefore, the improvement was not supported by
a formal incentive structure. iii. The functions exhibited only an incipient continuous-improvement
culture. iv. The hierarchical and compartmentalized structure of the organization hindered cross-
functional communication. So, it was encouraging that the upgrade of the performance system triggered a
measurable improvement in delivery performance despite these hindrances, because it indicated that a
carefully designed performance measurement system could improve the performance of an internal
supply chain.
The results of the second treatment, introducing an explicit goal, were inconclusive. The departure of
the project sponsor coincided with this treatment, masking any effect it may have had. The control
variables were unable to reveal the magnitude of the unwanted effect. There is also the question, whether
the first treatment had already made the goal too explicit, causing the effect of the second treatment to be
insignificant. To determine these effects additional experiments will be required. A potential expansion of
some of the modifications herein described to other spare part businesses in Boeing could be a powerful
source of additional data. It would also allow us to gain insight into the differences between enhancing an
institutional and a parallel performance measurement system.
The third treatment, introducing performance data segregated by functions, did not have a significant
impact on the performance of the internal supply chain. This is a somewhat paradoxical result, because
from the experiment's inception functional managers insistently requested performance data be
segregated by function. This phase dealt with the tradeoff between a metric's validity and its ability to
integrate. By increasing the measurement's granularity, the treatment attempted to increase the
accountability and controllability that each function had over the measured performance at the expense of
cross-functional integration. The quantitative evidence suggested that the gain in controllability did not
improve the functional performance. Yet compelling anecdotal evidence indicated that the treatment
caused the functions to stop focusing on overall performance and start concentrating on their own
functional performance instead. Furthermore, the treatment caused an increase in the amount of
information that had to be processed and communicated. So, even if the performance did not improve the
system was better off when it had one metric that encompassed all the functions. Anecdotal evidence also
suggested that providing granular order information (e.g., the list of parts that missed the overall goal)
partially offset the loss of accountability of a more comprehensive metric.
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This thesis contains several lessons for companies engaging in performance measurement system
redesigns. First, know thy supply chain. The performance measurement system may not be the central
source of coordination or incentive issues in your case. The original methodology introduced on page 32
is a good starting point for identifying the salient issues that affect a supply chain.
Second, even small modifications to a parallel, non-official performance system in an adverse
environment can generate measurable results. This is encouraging, especially for managers who cannot
modify the institutional performance measurement system, but need to induce and monitor change in the
supply chain. It is foreseeable that a design change in the official measurement system would generate an
even larger impact on performance, because it would be backed by a formal incentive structure and a
higher perception of importance. But, even setting up a parallel performance measurement system seems
to be a high-leverage, yet economic tool to improve performance (how economic, depends of course on
the existing information systems' infrastructure).
Third, an integrative metric seems to be preferable than a more controllable one (at least for supply
chains similar to the one herein studied). It fosters focus on global process performance, while reducing
the complexity of processing and communicating performance data. It would not be surprising that in the
long run it fostered cross-functional co-operation, too. The experiment showed that under the more
integrative metric the internal supply chain did at least not deteriorate its performance. Retaining a high
granularity in the order data (in our case the list of parts that missed the lead-time) allowed the
identification of problems' root causes, partially compensating for the loss in accountability.
And finally, but not least importantly, "what you measure is what you get" seems to contain some
truth after all, unlike so many other popular adages.
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Glossary of Terms
AOG order
ATS
Behaviorally sound
metric
Causally oriented
system
Compatible metric
Comprehensive
system
CRT order
Cycle time
Detailed metric
Economical metric
Front-End
Horizontally
integrated system
Integrative metric
Internally
comparable system
Lead-time
Planning
Process time
Production
Regular orders
Robust metric
Scheduling
Service level
Spares Distribution
Center
Useful metric or
system
Valid metric
Vertically
integrated system
Aircraft on Ground order. Highest level of criticality for a spare part order.
The AOG Tracking System tracked the fulfillment of AOG and Critical orders.
Metric that aligns people's actions with the objectives of the organization.
Performance measurement system that tracks those activities that influence
current and future performance.
Metric that is in tune with the existing IT infrastructure.
Performance measurement system that captures all the relevant performance
dimensions and stakeholders.
Critical order. Second highest level of criticality for a spare part order.
Total time that an order remains in a supply chain step.
A metric is detailed enough, if it is useful to the decision maker.
Metric that adds more value than the cost of measuring it.
Functions that handled the issues found in the initial order-screening process.
Performance measurement system that includes all the pertinent activities and
functions along the process.
Metric that encompasses all the major components of the process and promotes
cross-functional co-operation.
Performance measurement system that allows trade-offs between the different
performance dimensions.
Management-determined constant that indicates the maximum allowable cycle
time for a process.
Manufacturing organization that issues production plans for parts.
Total time during which value is added to an order.
Manufacturing organization that produced the parts.
Lowest level of criticality for a spare part order.
Widely accepted and easily interpretable metric that is comparable to others.
Manufacturing organization that scheduled the production of spare parts.
Percentage of orders that are fulfilled in less than the lead-time.
Organization that managed the inventory of finished spare parts and the
outbound logistics for all spare parts.
A performance measurement system or a metric is useful, if it is readily
understandable and suggests an appropriate course of action.
Metric that reflects an actual and controllable process.
Performance measurement system that translates the firm's strategy to all the
decision-makers in the organization and features a proper incentive system.
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Appendix: Methodology to Map the Supply Chain
I have developed a general methodology to analyze internal and external supply chains. It is particularly
useful to identify sources of variability in the delivery process. The seven steps below describe how to
apply it. Figure 8 provides a mock sample of the resulting document.
Step 1: Identify
the supply chain
and its
boundaries
Step 2: Identify
the involved
functions
Step 3: Identify
the processes
Step 4: Identify
material and
information
flows
Step 5: Estimate
process and
cycle times
Step 6: Identify
incentive and
coordination
issues
Determine the boundaries of the supply chain you want to analyze. Identify the
function that triggers the supply process and the function that receives its end
product. When possible start and end the process at an external customer. Identify
the events that trigger and conclude the supply process. Is the triggering event the
creation of a customer need, a sale, or the issuance of an order? Is the concluding
event the fulfillment of an order, its reception by a customer, the start-up of a
machine? Challenge the boundaries several times by asking whether there are other
relevant events before or after the process you have identified. Verify that the scope
is comprehensive enough to avoid too narrow an analysis.
Identify all the internal and external functions involved in supplying the product or
service. This is unlikely to be the final list, because it will be refined in subsequent
iterations. List these functions across the top of the page. Sort them in the order in
which they intervene in the fulfillment of the supply process (do not repeat
functions). The first function is the owner of the triggering event and the final one
the recipient of the end-product or service (if different from the triggering function).
Providing a service, fulfilling an order, or delivering a product requires a series of
transformation processes. Identify these main steps and capture them in boxes.
Position the boxes underneath the function responsible for the process. Vertically
stack the processes in the order in which they are performed.
Connect the processes identified in the previous step with arrows that indicate the
flow of material and information. Denote inventory with triangles (label the triangle
with the good held). Denote a decision step with a diamond. Place it underneath the
function that is responsible for the decision. Label the arrows leaving each diamond
with the applicable decision criteria. Indicate different modes of transportation with
appropriate pictures, like trucks, planes, or ships.
Estimate the process and cycle times for each of the processes and note them in the
column on the right. The process time is the total time during which value is added to
the order (in queuing theory terms it is the sum of all the service times in a supply
chain step). The cycle time is the total time that an order stays in a supply chain step
(in queuing theory terms, it is the system occupancy time or the sum of all the service
and waiting Times). The cycle time should be captured as a range. A high
discrepancy between the cycle and the process times indicates performance issues.
Identify incentive and coordination issues for each of the processes along the supply
chain. Pay special attention to the interfaces between functions and processes, as
these are fertile ground for such issues. Also, high discrepancies between process
and cycle times usually indicate the existence of incentive or coordination issues.
Note them in the corresponding columns on the right.
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Step 7:
Interview,
validate, and
iterate
In this iterative step interview the people identified in step 2. Discuss with each
interviewee the details of the supply chain map completed so far. Ask for additions
and modifications to the map. Verify your estimates for process and cycle times
(normally, additional data will be necessary to verify these estimates). Discuss the
incentive and coordination issues identified so far. Probe for additional issues. Ask
for referrals. Repeat.
Once this process is finalized group the incentive and coordination issues into families. These families
constitute focus areas for supply chain improvement projects. The chapter The Pre-Intervention Supply
Chain (page 10) provides an example of the type of issues that this methodology can uncover.
Customer Spares Materiel Manufacturing Unit Spare Distrib. Times Issues
O rg a niz ati o n s up pli er S c h e d u linq o d u ctio n P ro c . C y c le In c e n tiv e s C o o rd in atio n
10 hrs 30-50 All orders cost theStep 1: Identify Step 2: List functions hrs same
tm cheks triggering event across top
ssorder and Part isn't on Secs 1 hr Step 5: Estimate
assigns tracking ------- hand Step 3: Identify process & cycle
processes times
s on an Orders raw
material and 24-48 Doesn't talk to
commits Step 4: Draw flows 4 hr hrs productio
Prd. RM schedule
parts Cuts tubing to - L _ Isn't penalized for Receives orderg24 hr 10 days late delivery over phone
Picks part from 2 hr 15 days Nobody tracks
P -on assembl line perfromance
hand, but Obtains
it's a nDoesn't haveI it' a egine ringinternal
production design and 8 hr 3.5 days riorization
part manufactures processpart
Tests, marks, FP compensation not
Part is on and stages part. 12 hr .5-1 day tied to
hand and it Issues shipping performance
is a spare
art _ _ __ ___ - -- - - --- -- _- _Picks part from
finished product 2 hr .5-1 day
inventory
Ships to Sometimes wait
c hr -5ysdays for pick up
Receive rt 3 days 3 days
Material & Information Flow Step 6:Identify
incentive & coord.
Material Flow issues
Step 1 b: Identify 
- Information Flow
concluding event S 7nfrmaionFlo
<> Decision Process Stp7:Reriw
validate and iterate
Inventorv p
Figure 8. Sample outcome of the supply chain analysis methodology herein described.
An actual document would have a higher level of detail. The data is not representative of
any actual system.
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